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Abstract. According to Jeanne Parain-Vial and others, humans are characterized by 
their need for analogy, together with the need for logic and intelligibility, and this 
need is expressed by a continuous research of models in the scientific field that can, 
in some aspects, bring to light some properties of reality, namely be analogous of 
them. The knowability of things is founded on analogy; thus, they are not exhausted 
by a single model of knowledge but rather through multiple and autonomous forms 
of comprehension. 
As also pointed out by Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenskij, mythical thought 
was the first to postulate the possibility of establishing a relationship of likeness 
among very different realities, as in the archetypical cosmological model of world: 
a possibility that, as they explain, has survived in post-archaic man, constituting a 
fundamental component of cognitive activity and scientific modelling.       
The article is dedicated to the use of analogy in Lotmanian semiotic theorization 
and to its heuristic and epistemological value.  
Keywords: Lotman, semiotics, epistemology, analogy  
1. The antinomy unity-multiplicity and 
the role of Aristotelian analogy
In modern time, the problem of the relationship between totality and parts (or 
unity and multiplicity) strongly emerged in the field of biology around the end 
of the 18th century, with the Cuvierian concept of mutual dependence of functions, 
namely a perspective that observes the living not through taxonomic-descriptive 
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criteria – from the simpler and more inert toward the more living and complex – but 
catches it in its unity and functional interdependence, as well as in its dynamics. In 
his Archéologie des sciences humaines Michel Foucault (2005: 291) writes that from 
Cuvier and from the concept of focus of identity the identity of the living is certainly 
stated through a play of differences, but these emerge only against the background 
of great functional unities with their own internal systems of dependences: from 
Cuvier “multiplicity is apparent and unity is hidden. […] the differences proliferate 
on the surface, but deeper down they fade, merge, and mingle, as they approach the 
great, mysterious, invisible focal unity, from which the multiple seems to derive, as 
though by ceaseless dispersion” (Foucault 2005: 291, 293). According to Foucault, 
the French biologist’s vision, with its tension to discover the invariant structure of 
reality, or the functional homogeneity that secretly sustains it, lays the foundations 
of modern structuralism and reconfigures the whole-part relationship, fundamental 
for the developments of cybernetics and the theory of information.1 
At that time, the same operation was also made by Goethe, albeit from a differ-
ent scholarly point of view and in a completely autonomous way.2 The research of 
1  In the following quotation we can glimpse the Lotmanian idea of culture as an organic 
system: “Th is reference to function, and this uncoupling of the level of identities from that of 
diff erences, give rise to new relations: those of coexistence, of internal hierarchy, and of dependence 
with regard to the level of organic structure” (Foucault 2005: 289). 
2 Just as Goethe was elaborating his idea of “archetypical level of reality” (fundamental for 
Russian Symbolism), Cuvier made the conceptual reversal towards the modern biology. Th e 
main distinction between the two scholars – as Ernst Cassirer points out – was a diff erent 
perspective about the “movement” of reality: static and structural in Cuvier’s vision; genetic and 
dynamic in Goethe’s. However, even though very close, Goethe criticized Cuvierian structural 
functionalism, not appreciating that they both were moving towards the same theorization of 
living, although from two diff erent epistemological points of view. Cassirer (2007[1946]: 306–
307) – putt ing the antithesis Goethe-Cuvier back in its right perspective and giving at last a 
defi nition of proto-structuralism – writes: “Goethe did not stand alone in this concept of the 
organic world. His theory of metamorphosis was rich in new and original ideas. In order to 
defend these ideas he had to challenge the greatest scientifi c thinkers of his age. In the famous 
controversy between Cuvier and Geoff roy de Saint-Hilaire he passionately sided with the latt er. 
[…] [But his polemic with Cuvier was not so incompatible as that with Newton’s optics]. Cuvier 
advocated a static view of organic nature; Goethe a genetic or dynamic view. Th e former laid 
stress upon the constancy, the latt er on the modifi ability, of organic types. Yet, when going into 
the details of their discussion, we fi nd that Goethe, even in his genetic view, was much nearer to 
Cuvier than to Darwin. In his Geschichte der biologischen Th eorien Emanuel Rádl describes the 
biology of Goethe, of Cuvier and of Geoff roy de Saint-Hilaire as a “morphological idealism”. Th at 
seems to me to be a very good and felicitous term. It expresses the common basis that remained 
unshaken in the controversy. Cuvier, Goethe and Geoff roy de Saint-Hilaire were unanimous in 
emphasizing that there are no mere accidental things in an organism. If we have found one of 
its characteristics, we have all the others; we can reconstruct the organism in its entirety. “C’est 
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a principle of unity despite the diversity, namely the wish to explain the coherence 
of the real (in a metaphysical and physical perspective) leads Goethe to write his 
theory of nature,3 referring to what Cassirer talks about as “morphologic idealism”, 
attributing to this the genesis of structuralism, together with Cuvier’s perspective. 
The scientist Goethe, as Tzvetan Todorov (1991: 636) puts it, “conceived the idea 
of an internal relation among the different species of animals and plants, which had 
been originated by transformations […] from a protoform that was not possible 
to observe” – in other words, Goethe established relationships of similarity among 
different identities, starting from the intuition of the only matrix.  
In both perspectives, the Aristotelian analogy restoration has a fundamental 
rule: building bridges among different orders of realities – for example, gills are to 
respiration in water what the lungs are to respiration in air (Foucault 2005: 288) – 
it respects the irreducible heterogeneity of the world and, at the same time, fore-
sees that cosmological coherence that the Greek thought had already splendidly 
expressed in the word kósmos through the dynamics of logos.4 By virtue of this, the 
analogy advances an idea of relationship between the one and the many, in which 
the one can only be a whole, decomposable in the many, but not reducible to them.   
In fact, with the Cuvierian concept of mutual dependence of functions and the 
Goethean morphologic idealism, the organism starts to be studied as a wholeness 
clearly not reducible to the sum of its components, or as a system structured on 
a multi-level hierarchy in which the upper levels appear to be qualitatively and ir-
reducibly different compared to the lower ones: what is defined, by contemporary 
science, as a “complex system”.5 This qualitative difference, as cybernetics aptly 
dans cett e dépendance mutuelle des fonctions”, says Cuvier, “[…] et dans ce secours qu’elles se prêtent 
réciproquement, que sont fondée les lois qui déterminent les rapports de leurs organes, et qui sont d’une 
nécessité égale à celle des lois métaphysique et mathématique”. […] “dans l’état de vie, les organes 
ne sont pas simplement rapprochés, mais qu’ils agissement les uns sur les autres, et concourent tous 
ensemble à un but commun.” [Cuvier, George 1835. Leçons d’anatomie comparée. Paris : Crochard, 
49–50]” (Cassirer, Ernst 2007[1946]: 306–307).
3 Th e most famous writings in which Goethe explains his vision of nature are the poems “Th e 
metamorphosis of animals” (Die Metamorphose der Tiere) and “Th e metamorphosis of plants” 
(Versuch die Metamorphose der Pfl anzen zu erklären).  
4 Th e term kósmos is deeply connected with the original meaning of logos (from léghein, 
“to gather”, “to get together”) – a concept used repeatedly by Lotman –, which means “link”, 
“calculus” and becomes “word” only later. Th e logos, moving along the multiplicity within its 
contradictions and aporie, gathers, connects and joins together the various objects of reality, 
highlighting reciprocal links, in order to fi nd a principle of unity in the structure of nature and 
thus to achieve a vision and understanding of the existing whole in an ordered whole (kósmos). 
5 Th e modern complexity is a problem that arose already in Aristotle’s philosophy by 
the concept of entelécheia, namely the emergence of the unity of the whole as a result of the 
coordinated activity of parts. 
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pointed out, is linked to the fact that information, fitting in different levels of the 
organization of matter, determines in each of these characters and properties that 
are diverse also qualitatively and not just through quantitative additions – as it was 
postulated from the classic taxonomic-descriptive perspective –, thus becoming ir-
reducible to one another. Saying that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, 
it has basically been stated that the whole contains new information (compared to 
those contained in the parts) that characterizes it as an entirety and as an identity; 
the information shows itself in its deepest meaning: gives form, unity, order, coor-
dination and directionality.6 At the same time, it has been stated that the whole has 
the faculty to replicate its parts, so that the parts can be said to be in a relation of 
analogy with the whole and, therefore, contain the identity of the whole.   
Here we find an explanation to why, in contemporary science, the Aristotelian 
analogy, in close connection with information, returns to play a central role in the 
clarification of the relationship between unity and multiplicity: going beyond the 
solely biological field, the analogy does not give reason only of the great organic 
unities that connect very different realities – as Foucault reported with the exam-
ple of respiration in general (gills are for the respiration in water what lungs are 
for breathing the air) – but solves in general the structural unity of the complex 
systems. Here, moreover, we find the explanation of why methodological reduc-
tionism, in order to preserve its heuristic legitimacy, should not end in conceptual 
reductionism, which tends to state a correspondence between the whole and the 
sum of its parts. 
Bearing in mind that “there are no mere accidental things in an organism. If we 
have found one of its characteristics, we have all the others; we can reconstruct 
the organism in its entirety” (Cassirer 2007[1946]: 306–307), let us see now 
how Lotman uses analogy to relate himself to the external world and thus to infer 
models of culture which may, in some aspects, reproduce reality itself, namely the 
entirety.7 
  
6 It is not by chance that in the language of biologists and mathematicians, the Aristotelian 
schema of hylomorphistic theory is reappearing, through an approach of the concept of 
“information” to “substantial form”, namely the principle that makes “one” the whole and 
imprints an identity to the matt er (Strumia 2002). 
7 In a very similar vein to Cassirer’s utt erance, Lotman (1967: 111-112) says in semiotic terms: 
“a structural researcher is always interested in relationships. […] he always considers facts in 
relationship with one another and with the system in its whole” (Lotman 1967: 111–112). 
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2. Lotman, the analogy and various models of culture
2.1. Semiotics and cybernetics. The super-complex system
The discovery of the weight of information in the complex system organization 
highlighted three key issues that we have to underline in order to obtain a deeper 
understanding of Lotman’s cultural models and, in particular, the cybernetic one: 
(1) how can a system maintain its identity and, at the same time, transform itself?; 
(2) how can a system preserve its balance in conditions of increasing disorder?; 
(3) how can a system generate new information though retaining its informative 
deposit?8  
When Lotman, since the early essays, defined culture as “the totality of non-
hereditary information acquired, preserved, and transmitted by the various 
groups of human society” (Lotman 1977[1967]: 213), he assigned a specifically 
cybernetic function to cultural codes: according to him, these “become instruments 
for preserving and transmitting information” (Lotman 1977[1967]: 213), so that 
basically an equivalence is established between culture and information. In this way 
he does nothing else but treat culture as a complex system, describing its dynamics 
and organization in the terms of a cybernetic structure. Now we have to make a 
reflection of epistemological sort. In the equivalence 
<information : cybernetic complex system (1) = cultural codes : culture (2)> 
 
a theoretical and methodological assumption is implied – analogies of proper 
proportionality  (or similar structures of relationships) are in fact stated between 
cybernetic models (1) and semiotic models (2), so that if we know the structure of 
relationships and properties of the former, we can describe the structure of the latter 
in a similar manner despite the different nature of the two objects (these are so-called 
material analogies). In this case, we could talk about an “external” use of the analogy 
in Lotmanian semiotics: in fact, he adopts the analogy as a heuristic device suited 
for creating a dialogue of semiotics with the outside world, or rather with the other 
sciences, and to deduce patterns that, through the material analogies, might reveal 
some properties of culture, which is exactly what happens in the epistemological 
comparison between cybernetics and semiotics. Later we will see how Lotman used 
the analogy also in an “internal” way, or as a gnoseological device suited to explain 
the semiotic mechanism of culture, namely the internal dynamics of culture.  
8 Th ese three key issues arise since the 1960s–1970s in the following writings of Lotman’s: 
Lotman 1967: 107–127; Lotman 1977[1967]; Lotman, Uspensky 1973; Lotman 1980[1975]; 
Lotman 1979[1976]. 
It is necessary to underline that the above-mentioned issues in Lotman’s theory are strongly 
linked to Ivanov 1977[1965]; Ivanov 1978[1962]; Ivanov et al. 1977[1962]. 
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According to Lotman, an essential role is played by the hierarchical whole of 
codes which, by virtue of their structuring capacity, inform (in the sense of giving 
form) cultural objects, giving them a specific typological identity. In these terms, 
culture begins to have a new configuration, in which the system of codes, and the 
language (langue) in primis, ensures, on the one hand, the unity of the whole – the 
homeostatic function – and, on the other hand, the internal variety; Lotman and 
Uspensky (1978[1971]: 226) wrote in 1971 that the mechanism of the cultural 
system, on the one hand, “would exhibit particular homeostatic functions to such a 
degree as to preserve the unity of the memory, to remain the same, and on the oth-
er hand, would continually renew itself, deautomatizing itself at every phase and 
thereby maximizing its ability to absorb information”. 
Here we still do not have a real translation of the cybernetic model into semi-
otic terms, but this prepares the ground for the hypothesis that culture can be con-
figured as an organic unity whose internal dynamism relates to a historically accu-
mulated game of codes – so much so that the equivalence “culture = information” 
translates into the equivalence “information = memory”.
In an essay from a few years later, “Culture as collective mind and the problems 
of artificial intelligence” (1977), Lotman makes a real “translation” of the cyber-
netic mechanisms of the complex systems into culture, finding in the latter the at-
tributes (of semiotic nature) that make it a unity clearly not reducible to the sum of 
its components, in which the whole is replicated in all parts. As the cornerstone of 
the equivalence he puts “culture = collective mind” – a typical property of complex 
systems: the homeostasis (in increasing entropy conditions) that, in Lotmanian 
terms, is the cultural self-description in conditions of semiotic heterogeneity. 
The self-description is the moment in which a culture, in its historical process, 
creates a model of itself and, through this, gives order to the system. For the first 
time, Lotman and Uspensky talk about it in 1971, in the above-mentioned essay 
“On semiotic mechanism of culture”, they write: “at a specific stage in the develop-
ment of culture, there comes a moment when it becomes conscious of itself, when 
it creates a model of itself. The model defines the unified, the artificially schema-
tized image, that is raised to the level of a structural unity. When imposed  onto the 
reality of this or that culture, it exerts a powerful regulating influence, preordain-
ing the construction of culture, introducing order, and eliminating contradiction” 
(Lotman, Uspensky 1978[1971]: 227). 
In 1977 Lotman again takes up the problem of self-description in the light of 
supracomplex models of cybernetics. He opens the essay “Culture as collective 
mind and the problems of artificial intelligence” (Lotman 1979[1977]: 89) by 
wondering whether it is possible to transpose to the culture that mechanism by vir-
tue of which, in supracomplex models, “the stability of the whole grows with the 
growth of the internal diversity of the system” and, if so, how this can happen, since 
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a growing complexity should lead to an increase in entropy.9 According to Lotman, 
this problem is still linked to another question: which is the functional necessity 
of cultural polyglotism? And, most of all, why is the act of communication always 
conceived as an exchange of equivalent things – he is referring to Jakobson, Mauss, 
Lévi-Strauss – if it is an asymmetrical and polyglot exchange? Well, Lotman an-
swers, the appearance of semiotic communications is, at the same time, a source 
of heterogeneity and a device of homeostasis. As it happens in supracomplex sys-
tems it is true that the culture system shows a high internal diversity – this is clearly 
Lotman’s reference to the Bakhtinian ambivalence –, but it also true that these ir-
regular semiotic elements tend to become progressively autonomous structures by 
virtue of the unifying power of semiotic communication. Lotman (1979[1977]: 
91) writes: “The tendency to increase semiotic diversity within the organism of 
culture has the result that each meaning-bearing node of its structural organization 
begins to show a tendency to turn into a peculiar “cultural personality”, a closed 
immanent world with its own internal structural-semiotic organization, its own 
memory, individual behavior, intellectual capacities, and procedure for self-devel-
opment. […] culture as an integral organism represents a combination of structur-
al-semiotic formations, constructed according to the model of separate personali-
ties, and the systems of connections (communications) between them”. 
These formations are never atoms detached from the whole: otherwise, Lotman 
writes, culture would risk semiotic schizophrenia and then an implosion – polyglot-
ism that turns into a “Tower of Babel”. This is the deep meaning of self-description 
as a primary mechanism of semiotics of culture. The emergence of a metalanguage 
that necessarily follows the moment of self-description leads culture to understand 
itself through what Lotman calls an ideal self-portrait, but also to grasp the mean-
ing of the (seemingly inconsistent) semiotic heterogeneity on a higher level of ab-
straction (metalevel). “The metamechanism of culture”, as Lotman (1979[1977]: 
92–93) puts it, establishes a unity between the parts that strive for autonomy and 
becomes a language in which internal intercourse inside that culture is carried on. It 
contributes to the unification of separate structural nodes. Through it the isomor-
phism of the culture as a whole and its parts comes into being.10 
9 And, Lotman carries on, in semiotics terms, this translates into the emergence of a 
mechanism, internal to each culture, which serves as principle of identity (cohesion of the whole 
and refl ection of it in its parts). 
10 I think that here, as in other essays, Lotman assigns to isomorphism the meaning of 
similarity, analogy, resemblance. In mathematics, isomorphism actually implies a one-to-one 
correspondence between elements of distinct sets, by virtue of which there is no relationship of 
proper proportionality (or similarity of relationships), but an out-and-out equality. With reference 
to culture, isomorphism thus understood would create a situation of identity among texts and 
therefore conditions of semantic implosion: the force of culture, Lotman underlines, is exactly in 
its diff erential and relational unity, where texts – just because they are diff erent and, at the same 
time, overinformed by cultural identity – may give life to ever new instances of meaning.           
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We can realize that these properties have an exceptional value for the explana-
tion of cultural dynamics. Stating that there is an isomorphic relation between cul-
ture and its components, namely cultural objects (even if Lotman will talk about 
“texts”) actually means arguing that access to the texts – in which the only identity 
is replicated – can lead to the comprehension of the culture as a whole, provided 
that the movement from one to many and vice versa is always dialogic: the culture 
in light of the texts, the texts in the light of the culture, otherwise the simplifica-
tion and the reduction of the whole to its components. It is no accident that in “On 
the semiosphere” (1984), published several years later, Lotman will use a symbolic 
“prismatic” image to explain cultural dynamics: 
Like a face, which, wholly reflected in a mirror, is also reflected in any of its 
fragments, which, in this form, represent the part and yet remains similar to 
the whole mirror; so, too, is the integral semiotic mechanism and the separate 
text, relative to the isomorphism of all the texts of the world […]. [like] an 
object, reflected in a mirror, generates hundreds of reflections in its fragments, 
a communication, introduced into the integral semiotic structure, is circulated 
at the lower levels. The system facilitates the conversion of the text into an 
avalanche of texts. (Lotman 2005[1984]: 215–216)
Therefore the cybernetic analogy suggests another fundamental property of cul-
ture: as in the complex systems, where there is a resemblance among the parties 
and not an identity of structure, so in culture cultural objects are linked to each 
other and together by a relation of analogy with the whole (the culture), while, at 
the same time, they have their own characteristics: namely, there is always a mar-
gin of irreducibility and of dissimilarity among cultural objects (or the semantic 
gap). The continuous hybridization of these – being objects-in-relation – allows 
the system-culture to grow exponentially. Lotman often adopts the image of the 
Heraclitean logos, that grows by itself, to summarize cultural dynamics; and this is 
not by chance, because this term – although it has a polysemic meaning11 – is sum-
marized in the concept of phronesis (“mind”): logos and phronesis designate, at the 
same time, the language and the intelligence of the world, and undertake to gather 
the totality of things uttering and thinking their unity. Therefore the Heraclitean 
logos is a mind-that-utters12 that can intuitively read and discourse about the resem-
blances of reality, by their nature exponentially infinite – like unlimited semiosis. 
  We have thus discovered the “internal” use of analogy in Lotmanian semiotics: 
a gnoseologic device apt to explain the semiosis of culture. Thus, the principle of 
11 See the Heraclitean fragments in Diels-Kranz’s encoding.  
12 Again, it is not by chance that Lotman defi nes culture also as a thinking organization, namely 
as a collective mind-that-utt ers. 
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similarity is manifested, both among models belonging to different orders of reali-
ties (semiotics, cybernetics, biology) as well as inside the same order. This is why 
Lotman suggested already in 1967, in his “Thesis on the problem of ‘Art among 
the other modelling systems’”, a move from a semiotics based on the concept of a 
“system of signs” to one grounded on the concept of the “model”, as a heuristic way 
much more malleable – or less folded on contingency – and closer to the iconic 
sign (by its nature based on similarity). 
The “internal” use of analogy leads us to another important consideration. By 
it, we discover that the semiotic mechanism of culture has not only an ordering, 
“informant” function, which features cultural heterogeneity as a whole: in this case, 
it could not be explained – as it happens with the concept of genetic information in 
the field of biology – the way by which the system maintains and ensures its own 
identity and functional unity and, at the same time, transforms itself and grows. 
Just by virtue of the relation of similarity and a semantic gap among its compo-
nents, the semiotic mechanism of culture is also an intelligence creating thought 
and it is not a coincidence that after cybernetics Lotman should have been inspired 
by the dynamics of the human brain. 
Concerning this, let us come back for a moment to the mechanism of self-de-
scription. Talking about it, Lotman underlines how, within culture, the structuring 
of many semiotic formations interrelated with one another and unified by meta-
language generates a state of constant translation of the untranslatable, namely 
the condition of a cultural life: the creation of new information. Culture, always 
defined as nonhereditary memory of a collectivity, is now called collective intellect (a 
collective phronesis), a generative mechanism of ideas, exactly how it happens in 
the cerebral human activity: “It is this translation of the untranslatable that is the 
mechanistic for the creation of a new thought. At its base lies not a one-for-one trans-
formation, but an approximate model, a resemblance, a metaphor. At this point we 
can observe the striking isomorphism between culture – the apparatus of collec-
tive consciousness – and individual consciousness. We have in mind the fact of the 
asymmetry of the human brain – the semiotic in the work of the left and the right 
hemispheres” (Lotman 1979[1977]: 93–94). 
This opens the path to the theoretical switch of the 1980s and 1990s: attention 
to all that is heterogeneous in culture leads Lotman to study the functional asym-
metries of cerebral hemispheres (the left hemisphere: linguistic functions vs the 
right hemisphere: visual-spatial elaboration) and to propose an analogical relation-
ship between the bipolar structures of individual consciousness and the polyglot 
mechanism of cultural semiotics, namely the isomorphic correspondence between 
human cerebral activity – in its dialogical dynamics –, collective consciousness, 
text and culture. Referring to Ivanov’s writings on the structure of human con-
sciousness, Lotman (1979[1977]: 94) writes in his essay “Culture as collective 
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mind and the problems of artificial intelligence”: “No “monologic” (i.e. monoglot) 
apparatus could produce messages that are in principle new (thoughts), i.e. could 
be called a thinking apparatus. A thinking apparatus must have in principle (in the 
minimal schema) a dialogic (bilingual) structure. This deduction, incidentally, 
gives new meaning to the prophetic ideas of M. M. Bakhtin about the structure 
of dialogic texts. I have attempted to point out the common features in the study 
of individual and collective consciousness, and to indicate a new approach to the 
problem of artificial intellect”.
2.2. Semiotics and brain. The thinking organization
We have to underline that the relationship between dialogism and the isomorphic 
principle13 is not at all new in Lotman’s remarks. Already in the essay “Myth – name – 
culture” (1973) – whose profundity of thought reminds of some Mircea Eliade’s 
writings on myth14 – Lotman stresses that mythological thought (as an out-and-out 
way of knowledge), unlike the logic-syllogistic one, is based on the “capacity for 
establishing identifications, analogies, and equivalences” (1978[1973]: 226), as it 
happens, for example, in the isomorphism of “universe / society / human body” 
of the archaic consciousness.15 This way of proceeding of the thinking, Lotman 
continues, has by no means been lost and replaced by the abstract one, but rather it 
has remained a fundamental gnoseologic basis in humanity:16 
It can be assumed that the ontogenetically conditioned mythological layer 
is fixed in the consciousness (and language), making it heterogeneous and 
in the end creating tension between the poles of mythological and non-
mythological perception. “[…] heterogeneity is a primordial trait of the 
13  Th e isomorphic principle is meant always in the acceptation stressed in Footnote 10.
14  In particular Th e Myth of Eternal Return (1949). 
15  Analogical capacity that – Lotman continues – has not only sett led in the human language 
but has served as a fundamental scientifi c basis for the modern thought (logic-syllogistic) 
and, in primis, for the mathematical science. Again, in other essay, writt en together with Zara 
Minc, Literature and Mythology (1981), he said: “Just by [mythological] consciousness were 
elaborated the ideas of isomorphism and other -morphisms, which have played a crucial role in 
the development of mathematics, of philosophy and of other fi elds of theoretical consciousness” 
(Lotman, Minc 1981: 209).  
16  Th e analogy makes also in the “modern” man infi nite possibilities of linking. Th is is possible 
as the analogical language (or creative thought) does not specify the contents in an univocal way 
but potentially can express them in an endless variety of forms of expression – we could perhaps 
talk about “nebulous” meaning. Analogical mechanisms arise as constitutive of the expressive 
form of intuitional language.        
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human consciousness, for the mechanism of which the presence of at least two 
not completely mutually translatable systems is vitally necessary”. (Lotman, 
Uspensky 1978[1973]: 218)
In Lotman, myth – just like infantile consciousness and, partially, game – repre-
sents the synthesis of cultural dynamics because, on the one hand, it always needs 
another consciousness (the non-mythological or abstract consciousness) to be 
translated and, on the other hand, it is structurally untranslatable by this:17 it is just 
the asymmetry – which rules the relationship between the modern Reason and the 
mythological reason, the left hemisphere and the right one, the logic (discrete) lan-
guage and the analogical (non-discrete) one – that is an endless source of mean-
ing, principle of heterogeneity, an essential condition of the human and cultural 
communication. 
Concerning this, Lotman pays particular attention to the difference between 
discrete texts and non-discrete texts both in “Culture as collective mind and the 
problems of artificial intelligence” as well as in “The phenomenon of culture” 
(1978), in order to explain the monologic and dialogic mechanisms in the light of 
the principle of heterogeneity. He points out that the emergence of new informa-
tion within culture – by virtue of isomorphic principle between individual intel-
lect and collective intellect – is realized just through the dialogical encounter be-
tween discrete texts (verbal languages, corresponding to the pole of logical-abstract 
know ledge) and non-discrete texts (iconic languages, corresponding to the pole 
of synthetic knowledge). The constant “interference”, creolization and reciprocal 
translation between these two types of text ensure the elaboration of ever new in-
formation within culture.                         
From the remarks made up till now, we can make a fundamental conclusion 
about the function of analogy in Lotmanian semiotics: the coexistence of the one 
and the many, or the culture as identity and as heterogeneity, starts to be seen as a 
problem of coexistence of languages, which refers to the more general problem of 
distinction/separation/primacy between the logical-dialectic reason and the intu-
itive-noumenal mind. Analogy plays a key role here as it seems to be a dialogical 
solution within this antinomy. 
The distinction between rational (or abstract) and intuitive thought emerges 
in the 1970s in a mature way; however, we have to point out that this argument 
was already touched upon in Lotman’s early essay “Thesis on the problem of ‘Art 
among the other modelling systems’” (1967) in which Lotman (1975[1967]: 4) 
17 In the essay “Literature and mythology” (1981), Lotman will sharply criticize the bad 
translation of the mythological metaphorism by modernity, which – with its worship for  
Reason – tends to impose a logocentric vision of the world.       
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wrote: “so, in order that the results [of the modelling activity] can be perceived as 
an analogue of the object, they must be subject to specific rules of analogy, formu-
lated on intuitive or rational basis”. According to Lotman, the different takes on the 
real (thought as mind/nous and thought as reason/dianoia) give back the same re-
ality, making it knowable through its objects, caught both as noumenal objects and 
as analytical objects. Analogy has to be submitted to specific rules of intuitive or ra-
tional nature precisely because the recognition of relationships of similarity among 
the objects takes place via two different ways of thinking: intuitive or strictly analo-
gical (non-discrete) and logical-analytical (discrete).   
Summarizing the above, we can state that the “external” analogy leads Lotman 
to be inspired by scientific models of the human brain functioning, while the “in-
ternal” analogy stimulates him to find points of contact between the intuitive con-
sciousness and the logical-analytical one.18 In “Literature and mythology” (1981), 
written together with Zara Minc, he notes that “the continuous vision of the world 
and its verbal discrete modellization have an enormous cultural and intellectual 
value. […] In the last period” – Lotman continues – “it has made the attempt to 
correlate the continuous consciousness – (not-discrete) – with the right hemisphe-
re activity and the verbal discrete one with the left hemisphere activity” (Lotman, 
Minc 1985[1981]: 209). The sedimentation of the non-discrete consciousness in 
modern humans and its coexistence with the discrete (logical-analytical) espouses 
analogically with the dynamic of the hemispheres. If, according to cybernetics, the 
recourse to analogy was linked to the problem of the balance between order and 
entropy, stability and growth, now it is linked to interlinguistic and intercerebral 
translation – the mechanism that ensures the continuous emerging of new infor-
mation within culture. 
If, on the one hand, Lotman’s progressive approach to biology leads him to use 
an organicistic simile to define culture, on the other hand, it exhorts him to reflect 
repeatedly on the epistemological value of the analogy, on its lights and shadows – 
and this, as we will see, is linked to Lotman’ s growing worry about the relationship 
between humanities and natural sciences and, more generally, the predominance 
of science within contemporary culture. We notice it, for example, in the introduc-
tion to the various models of culture derived from theories of biological roots. In 
“Asymmetry and dialogue”, an essay from 1983, Lotman writes:
[…] the method of scientific though, which is able to reveal deep and otherwise 
inaccessible aspects of the phenomena, is analogical. Analogy can also become 
a source of mistakes and hasty conclusions, if it does not proceed with caution. 
18 Th e functional diff erence between intuitive consciousness and logical-analytical conscious-
ness is well explained in Lotman 1998[1981] and Lotman, Nikolaenko 2000[1983]. 
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This is exactly the case of the analogies between new discoveries in the brain 
asymmetry field and the semiotic asymmetry of culture, in particular as 
concerns the attempt to attribute the complex functions of culture to the left 
hemisphere or the right. […] concepts such as “right hemisphericity” and 
“left hemisphericity” can be used for the cultural phenomena only for focusing 
attention on a functional analogy known at another structural level. The caution 
in using this analogy does not diminish but increases its significance. It remains 
the most important fact: the belief that every intellectual construct has to have 
a bi- or poly-polar and the functions of these substructures are analogical at 
different levels: from the single text and the individual consciousness to the 
national cultures and all the culture of humanity. (Lotman 1985a[1983]: 104) 
This substantial reflection suggests some important aspects of his scientific method 
and the idea of culture that is taking shape in the 1980s. First of all, the concept of 
functional analogy gives evidence of Lotman’s acute awareness of the methodological 
debate that had appeared in the humanities, predominantly in the second half of the 
20th century – namely the need for a profound dialogue with natural sciences: an im-
practicable dialogue through a mere theoretical borrowing, but potentially fruitful by 
the “sensible” use of analogy, as an epistemological bridge among the various scien-
ces.19 Hence the caution of Lotman in bringing together two systems of different or-
ders, brain and culture, and his attention to thinking at a high level of abstraction, so 
that one (the culture) is not flattened on the other (the brain).20 
19 In the 20th century through the research of unifying methodological criteria, the scientifi c 
world undertook the transdisciplinary path as the only solution to the preservation of the 
plurality of scientifi c perspectives – that had been seriously compromised by the positivist 
reductionism of the 19th century, more oriented to tracing back everything to the criteria of 
formal and physic-natural sciences. Th e path was particularly diffi  cult for the humanities and 
social sciences as well as theoretical-philosophical sciences, which should refl ect on their 
epistemological specifi city, thus affi  rming the reasonableness of the intellectual experience unity, 
which is always expressed through a multiplicity of scientifi c models. Th e main problem that will 
still arise in the humanities now is striking a balance between formalizing and empiric-objective 
requirements and the hermeneutic vocation: by virtue of this, the humanities must not give in 
to the temptation to lean on the natural sciences to seem more “scientifi c”, but rather have to 
fi nd out the right harmonization with the latt er and, as Lotman writes, to use analogy just as a 
dialogical device (Gismondi 2002).    
20 In the same essay,” Asymmetry and dialogue” (1983), Lotman (1985[1983]: 100)  writes: 
“However, we have fi rmly to point out that the concepts of “right and left  hemisphericity”, when 
implied in the cultural fi eld, are adopted in a completely conventional way and that we have to 
consider how they would be in inverted commas. We make use of them just in order to recognize 
the analogy that is there between some subsystems functions of the collective consciousness 
and of the individual, being aware that the nature itself of this phenomena has not been well 
determined yet”. 
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Another aspect that emerges – from the hierarchical articulation in structures-
substructures analogically linked to one another against the background of the big 
organic unity called “culture of humanity” – is the gradual increase of the typical 
properties of complex systems: this will lead to a fundamental step in Lotmanian 
semiotics in which culture will coincide with the so called “semiosphere”, defini-
tively sanctioning the organicistic turn.   
In his essay “A theory about the reciprocal relationship among cultures (from 
the semiotic point of view)” (1983), Lotman (1985b[1983]: 122) writes: 
The tendency towards a growing autonomy of the elements and their trans-
formation in independent unities, and [the tendency towards] an increasing 
integration and transformation in parts of a whole contradict and appeal to 
each other, producing a structural paradox. The result is the creation of an 
one-structure, in which every part is a whole and, at the same time, each whole 
works as a part. 
 
2.3. Semiotics and biology. The semiosphere
I would like to open the part dedicated to the “last” Lotman by framing the scientific 
context in which he worked around the 1980s, lingering in particular over those 
theoretical instances that, gravitating in the Soviet area, more significantly affected 
Lotmanian semiotics: instances that refer essentially to the so-called “complex 
thought”. The reception of this conceptual framework, in fact, was essential for the 
realization of that theoretical and methodological leap that shaped a real culturology; 
this dilated the structural-formalist roots of the “first” semiotics towards a dialogical 
and interdisciplinary approach of analysis of culture.         
Between the 19th and the 20th centuries the horizon of sciences, especially in 
the West, saw (and is still seeing now) a shift from a “monocular” (mechanistic 
and deterministic) vision of science to a complex and multi-perspective one. In the 
field of formal and physical-natural sciences, a need was acknowledged for a radical 
revision of the assumptions around which traditional science defined and recog-
nized itself. Epistemology had to deal with the positivist ideal of the “maximum of 
datedness”, which needed a unified, quantitative, mathematical and axiomatic sci-
ence (Gismondi 2002). The answer of the scientific world to this definiteness was 
a perspective shift, which has seen the emergence of a science based on a plurality 
of models and heuristic methods and on the assumption of analogy as an episte-
mological category for the understanding of the different levels of reality through 
which the object (of the scientific research) can occur.  
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The science of the 20th century, furthermore, in order to explain the complex-
ity of certain phenomena and their properties (holism, aiming and ending, hetero-
geneity, discontinuity, unpredictability, non-linearity), became increasingly more 
directed towards the idea of “process”, partially overcoming the idea of “law of 
nature”, which, despite its ability to express the occurrences of nature through the 
logical-mathematical formalism, cannot explain those excesses and discontinuities, 
that are, however, constitutive of the major part of natural phenomena: such as in 
biology, and it is not by chance that most humanities use the biological analogy 
to explain complex phenomena such as social stratification, the emergence and the 
dynamics of cultural processes, the ideological-political movements.    
Within the sphere in this science-in-transition (the science of complexity) fall 
two thinkers on whose ideas Lotman – again through the “external” analogy – drew 
strongly: the biologist Vladimir Vernadsky and the chemist Ilya Prigogine. 
The contribution of the former to modern biology, as pointed out by Simonetta 
Salvestroni, consisted of a reversal of the traditional perspective, which led to a fo-
cus not on the “individual bricks” that make up the living being, but on the net-
work of biological and intellectual relationships that shape reality (the so-called 
“biosphere”): Vernadsky, in essence, interpreted the evolution of the planet as a 
whole cosmic, geological, biological, anthropological process (Salvestroni 1985). 
Prigogine’s contribution from his studies on the thermodynamics of irreversible 
phenomena was to give a strong push to the switch from a science based on the 
idea of cosmos – supported by immutable and ordering laws – to one based on the 
idea of an evolutionary process, which implies a vision of reality much more close-
ly linked to unpredictability.         
In the 1980s, Lotmanian “culture” becomes an extremely complex subject of 
study, that expands to greater and greater portions of reality, or to translating het-
erogeneous phenomena and setting them in dialogue (in a semiotic language) – for 
this reason, Lotman will talk about “culturology”. 
Lotman’s dialogue with natural sciences turns out to be particularly intense. 
The orientation towards super-complex systems of the cybernetic type and mod-
els inspired by the concept of structure-organism led him to enter the orbit of 
Vernadsky’s biological theories, whose influence was visible in Lotman’s essays of 
the early 1980s and, in a more mature way, in “On the semiosphere” (1984). 
However, in the preface to Text and Context. Semiotics of Art and Culture, an 
anthology published in Italy in 1979, Lotman had already written: 
The penetration of the text [which Lotman defines as “heterogeneous” by virtue 
of the continuous process of translation] in the cultural system must not […] 
be associated with the static proximity of particular mechanisms and reminds 
something like the tissue of a living organism – more dynamic, interrelated 
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and not subject to unique determinations. So, as the whole of biological beings 
forms the biosphere of our planet, which is the indispensable condition for the 
existence of life, so the global sphere of culture is the necessary condition for 
the existence of thought. Intellectual activity is in fact possible only if there is 
a reciprocal relationship between the individual consciousness and the various 
semiotic-cultural contexts. (Lotman 1980: 4)  
This prepares way for an idea of culture as living tissue swarming with texts, never 
completed in themselves, always turned towards the  only identity: namely, culture 
that is mirror of both the individual identity and collective identity.  
The “external” use of analogy is, at this point, a very fruitful heuristic device, 
which leads Lotman to make an operation similar to one of Cuvier: to find a focus 
of identity of cultures, not starting from the single bricks, but going to catch it in the 
unity of its analogical relations.  
The solution proposed by Lotman, regarding semiotics more and more able to 
embrace the multiplicity and the heterogeneity of the real, is to create a bridge be-
tween biology and culture – conceiving the latter, analogically to the living, as an 
organic unity – and to consider any cultural event, not in a state of isolation, but 
rather “in a specific semiotic continuum, which is filled with multi-variant semiotic 
models situated at a range of hierarchical levels” (Lotman 2005[1984]: 206) – the 
“semiosphere”, a concept that Lotman derives (borrowing it in a semiotic key) 
from Vernadsky’s work The Biosphere (1926).      
Lotmanian semiotics is gradually finding its place in the orbit of the “complex 
thought”, a scientific paradigm that, based on the study of nonlinear systems21 and 
on the legacy of cybernetics, has reconsidered the relation between the whole and 
its parts in compliance with a holistic vision, arguing for the non-reducibility of the 
entire to its single components by virtue of those whole properties that, at certain 
levels of complexity, emerge as new information. 
Assuming the anti-reductionist perspective of the complex thought, Lotman 
(2005[1984]: 208) stated in “On the semiosphere”: “by sticking together individ-
ual steaks, we don’t obtain a calf, but by cutting up a calf, we may obtain steaks”, 
as if to say that culture, as organism provided with multiple levels of organization 
and stratification, can be surely broken down in many formal objects but it will be 
21  Study inaugurated by Henri Poincaré and then abandoned for decades aft er his death. Th e 
concept of non-linearity, in physics and in mathematical sciences, was a fact crucial for the 
introduction of the concept of complexity, namely the non-reducibility of the whole to the sum 
of its parts. In fact, when it works with non-linear systems, it is not possible to trace back the 
study of a solution to the study of simpler and well-known solutions – and this is fundamental 
if we think that most of natural phenomena can be described just through systems of non-linear 
equations.           
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understood in its richness only through an overview, based on the interdisciplinary 
dialogue.  
We also have to keep in mind that this essay starts precisely with a reflection 
on the tendency of structuralism to ontological reductionism. The methodological 
statement of the traditional scientific thought, Lotman writes, is to set the simplest 
element as a starting point and to examine the entirety in the light of the smallest 
constituents. “However,”  Lotman (2005[1984]: 206) continues, “in this there is 
also the danger that heuristic expedience (the convenience of analysis) comes to 
be accepted as the ontological character of the object, which is assigned to it by the 
structure derived from the simplest and clearly outlined atomistic elements, in ac-
cordance with their complexity. The complex object is thus reduced to the totality 
of the simple”. Let us thus pick up, for a moment, the epistemological premise of 
“On the semiosphere”. According to Lotman, the tendency of semiotic traditions 
to consider the simplest and atomic elements as the basis – a tendency that even 
Soviet semiotics followed at the time of the Symposium on the structural study of 
sign systems (1962) – can surely be considered as a heuristic opportunity, a facilita-
tion in the study of complex semiotic objects; however, in case this opportunity is 
translated into a simplification of the object, or transforms the reduction into an 
“ontological character of the object” (Lotman (2005[1984]: 206), then semiotics 
would betray its own purpose – here Lotman is basically describing the shift from 
methodological to conceptual reductionism. 
The choice, therefore, to abandon the equivalence “complex object as sum of 
simple elements”, privileging an organicistic vision of culture, is precisely about a 
concern of the epistemological order, which can lead semiotics to paths incompat-
ible with its object of research: culture is extremely complex by its nature. “[A]ll 
structures will look as if they are constructed out of individual bricks. However, it 
is more useful to establish a contrasting view: all semiotic space may be regarded 
as a unified mechanism (if not organism). In this case, primacy does not lie in one 
or another sign, but in the “greater system”, namely the semiosphere” (Lotman 
(2005[1984]: 208). The semiosphere emerges as a semiotic continuum in which 
every single semiotic act is such by virtue of the semiosic membrane that informs 
it. Hence, Lotman (2005[1984]: 220) wonders: “[I]s the whole universe not a 
form of communication, falling within an ever more general semiosphere? Is it not 
destined for a universal reading?” 
He does not give, for the moment, an answer to this question, leaving it as the 
final reflection of his intellectual parable. However, this question mark opens the 
way for further reflection, that is the relation between isomorphism and asym-
metry, identity and difference. Lotman premises, in fact, that in case we want to 
study the semiosphere as a universal unity, the principle of heterogeneity should 
be guaranteed, such as a basic mechanism of culture: the homogeneity of an 
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organism must always be matched by the heterogeneity of its elements. How does 
this dynamic happen? Lotman sees the semiosphere as a hierarchical system with 
various levels of organization where, however, the hierarchy does not imply a dis-
tribution of its elements in terms of value – from the most important language to 
the least – but in terms of (reflected) relationships with the extra-linguistic world; 
Lotman (2005[1984]: 216) writes: “[T]he textual and iconic languages of picto-
rial forms are not isomorphic to each other. But each of them, in a variety of ways, 
is isomorphic in the extra-semiotic world of reality, which they represent in a given 
language”. Some years later, in his Culture and Explosion, Lotman will talk about 
a resolution of the antinomy relationship between language and world beyond the 
boundaries of language: it is exactly the reciprocal untranslatability of languages 
(polyglotism) that is the source of the adequacy of the extra-linguistic object as 
regards its reflection in the world of language (semiosphere) – the unsayability of 
the world uttered through logical-analytical language (“to render the inexpressible 
in words and to express the world, which lies beyond the limits of logic, in logi-
cal terms”) can become an accomplished expression through the synthetic-creative 
language and vice versa (Lotman 2009[1992]: 21). 
Here, the distinction between primary and secondary modelling has definite-
ly lapsed and the role of the isomorphic principle is clarified; a principle that im-
plies both a relationship of vertical similarity (identity) among the elements of the 
semiophere – which ensures the unity of the system – as well as a relationship of 
horizontal heterogeneity (asymmetry) among them – which provides – the system 
dynamics.   
This organization has a fundamental consequence in terms of emergence of 
new information. Concerning this, Lotman uses two beautiful images to explain 
the productivity of the Heraclitean logos: the face, and the object in the crushed 
mirror. The vertical isomorphism, by virtue of the principle of identity among cul-
ture, text and individual consciousness,22 and the horizontal asymmetry together 
produce an exponential growth of information, namely unlimited semiosis.
What we have just said has fundamental consequences from the point of view 
of Lotmanian ethics. Lotman, in order to explain the value of the difference (asym-
metry) within the identity, uses an image he holds very dear: that of hands super-
imposed (enantiomorphism). The opposable hands, in fact, are identical, but they 
lose their specular symmetry when superimposed. The same occurs in communi-
cation: it is not possible communication and, therefore, knowledge (information 
exchange) outside a dialogical relationship where, despite mutual understanding, 
the subjects of the communicative act remain irreducible to each other. Dialogue, 
Lotman goes on to say (2005[1984]: 218), precedes language and gives birth to 
22 Provided it is in a constant relation with extra-cultural reality. 
330 Laura Gherlone
it: the image of Robinson Crusoe who lives in seclusion is utopian and contradicts 
reality.  
It has to be stressed that, according to Lotman, dialogue is the same semio-
sphere or the substratum of meaning that informs us and precedes us in any act. 
And for this reason, it is not possible even to think about the semiosphere with-
out a horizontal heterogeneity: it would be an intrinsic contradiction to cultural 
semiosis, so that semiosphere – only held up by vertical isomorphism would in 
result be all flattened to the identical and finally implode, exhausting itself in the 
non-difference.  
The enantiomorphic principle becomes, therefore, a symbol of the isomor-
phism-asymmetry bond because it is expression of what we might call a “correla-
tive difference”: this “distinguishes both identity – rendering dialogue unless  – 
and non-correlative difference – rendering it impossible.  […] the enantiomor-
phism represents the primary “mechanism” of dialogue” (Lotman 2005[1984]: 
220–221).  
2.4. Semiotics and epistemology of complexity. 
The laboratory of unpredictability
The idea of process also enters Lotmanian semiotics, especially with regard to 
Prigogine’s studies of complexity and the “new alliance” between man and nature.
The Russian scientist and epistemologist, studying non-equilibrium thermo-
dynamics,23 assigned a driving role in the thermodynamic systems evolution 
to complexity and the emergence of the unpredictable, scaling down the clout 
gained by the laws of nature in the (at times deterministic) explanation of the lat-
ter.24 Giuseppe Tanzella-Nitti (2002: 797–798) points out that what he did was 
to affirm unpredictability over predictability, non-equilibrium over equilibrium, 
creative development over the expected, falling however – by the assignment of 
23 Th e study of evolution of thermodynamic systems, far from solutions of equilibrium, allows 
to describe the emergence of organized structures morphologically richer and more complex 
than shown by the starting system. Th e “non-equilibrium solutions” – possible around the 
system’s “bifurcation points”, which are also the less explicable and therefore only dealt with in a 
probabilistic way – describe the evolutionary dimension or creative development of the system. 
Th e “equilibrium solutions”, which come true far from the bifurcation point instead, would trace 
the system back to the predictable and deterministic phenomenology, represented by its well-
known laws (Tanzella-Nitt i 2002). 
24  More easily associated with the description of equilibrium systems, with static solutions, 
with predictable developments, natural laws would refer to the notion of a bond and of eternal 
recurrence, while the idea of emergence or complexity would refer to the notion of creativity 
or event of freedom (Tanzella-Nitt i 2002: 797).   
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a metaphysics value to the non-equilibrium thermodynamics paradigm – in a by-
passing of his epistemological field: Prigogine, reopening the terms of an already 
classic tension, supported the primacy of becoming above  being, process above 
substance, introducing into this comparison great ideas of philosophy and re-
ligion  – as an appropriate philosophical frame he cited Martin Heidegger’s work 
Being and Time (1927), and Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy of process.
Prigogine, claiming a less deterministic science on behalf of one more tied to 
the creative force of unpredictability, in a way attempted an interdisciplinary dia-
logue with the humanities, the “seat” of creativity and freedom, namely of those at-
tributes that might inhabit also natural science.25 
Although seemingly far from the semiotic discourse, the non-equilibrium ther-
modynamics phenomenology – welcomed by Lotman in his later works – under-
pins several cruxes of Lotmanian thought, in particular those related to time; and 
not casually, since Prigogine’s scientific paradigm is precisely focused on the transi-
tion from the concept of static time (expected) to one that is dynamic-creative (un-
predictable). Obviously, Lotman’s time is not a physical but a semiotic category, 
which refers to historical constructions, namely the ideological-political, artistic, 
scientific visions: the semiotized time par excellence.   
The “external” analogy is thus created by an epistemological encounter between 
the scientific notions of predictability and unpredictability26 and the historical-
semiotic concepts of gradualism and explosion; it represents, therefore, the device 
through which Lotman definitively gets in possession of history, reintroducing it 
into the semiotic mechanism of culture – his later writings, in fact, all lean towards 
an explanation of the ways through which culture moves forward in its historical 
development. Lotman (2009[1992]: 8) writes: “A minefield with unexpected ex-
plosive points and a river in spring with its powerful but directed stream – these 
are the two images visualised by the historian studying dynamic (explosive) and 
gradual processes”. 
What Lotman did in his later works, Culture and Explosion (1992) and 
Unpredictable Mechanisms of Culture (1993, posthumous), was to give historical 
thickness to semiosphere, bringing to light the semiotic mechanisms that underlie 
the great ideological constructions and their internal contradictions.        
25  Tanzella-Nitt i (2002: 797–798) does not lack in adopting a seriously critical perspective 
towards Prigogine: the Russian chemist, in fact, would tend to create a reductionist equivalence 
between natural laws and determinism, between the principle of legality (namely the regularities 
or laws of nature) and fi xity, thereby att ributing the capacity of generating innovation and 
richness in the universe just to non-equilibrium thermodynamics.  
26  Concepts that, as we have just seen, implied the notions of natural laws and evolutionary 
process.  
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Concerning this, Lotman’s semiotic conception of temporality is in strong con-
nection with the ways in which humanity thinks about itself and expresses the phe-
nomenological world that surrounds it: art, science, ancient and modern mytholo-
gies (namely the grand narratives), technology, behaviour and collective passions, 
economic systems, social configurations (in their individual-collective polariza-
tion), history and geography – these latter intended as human constructions and 
interpretative categories of temporality and spatiality.   
We could sum up the system of similarity relationships between Lotman’s and 
Prigogine’s thought as depicted in Table 1.
The question that underlies Lotman’s growing emphasis on unpredictability con-
cerns the idea of culturology as a science able to reproduce, progressively more, the 
real dynamics of culture. Scientific investigation, as pointed out by Mihhail Lotman 
(1993: 484), generally tends to analyze the “realized”, stopping short of the realm of 
the failed potentialities: an approach that is harmful to the study of culture, which – 
Mihhail Lotman (1993: 484) continues – is not made by manifestly realized events 
but also by all those “unrealized possibilities [that] are also of the essence of reality 
even if they are fated to remain in a state of latent possibility”. However, these pos-
sibilities build the dynamic potential of culture, i.e., its un exploded paths and possible 
bifurcations: as if to say that “a loaded but undischarged gun is not functionally iden-
tical with an unloaded one” (M. Lotman 1993: 484). 
The adoption of a scientific approach to culture that denies the possible and 
disowns the unpredictable can have two essential consequences, according to 
Lotman. Firstly, in the wake of Hegelian historicism, the “lost” ways are forgot-
ten by the scholar, who thus deprives the model of its complexity (the hierarchi-
cal stratification of possibilities) and its intrinsic dynamics. Secondly, this creates 
a model of culture in which the historical dimension – par excellence the field in 
which the dialectic between events-in-potential and events-in-being is played out – 
is completely reduced to “it could not have gone in a different way”: namely the 
false eschatological inevitability of events that often turns into an ideology of histo-
ry. The value of unpredictability, in Lotman’s writings, has an eminently ethical na-
ture and not safeguarding it can lead to an impasse both on the theoretical horizon 
as well as on the pragmatic one; in Culture and Explosion, Lotman (2009[1992]: 
14) writes: “By removing the moment of unpredictability from the historical pro-
cess, we make it totally redundant. From the position of a bearer of Reason who 
holds to the process of the internal point of view (such as may be God, Hegel or 
any other philosopher, who has mastered the “singular scientific method”), this 
movement is deprived of informativity”, i.e., of the new that can open up unthink-
able paths and bring to light unexpected possibilities. 
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Unpredictability in this sense is the opposite not so much of predictability but 
rather of mono-perspectivity, namely of a vision of things that does not take into 
account the substantial diversity of the real, in its being in presence or in potential, 
visible or invisible.
According to Lotman, in fact, predictability has a positive value and a key role 
in the historical-cultural process, as an engine of the new even though in an “ex-
pectant” form, or prepared and gradually accompanied by an incremental sequence 
of events (by the “river in spring with its powerful but directed stream” (Lotman 
2009[1992]: 8). 
Therefore we should not see the predictability as a source of ideological inflec-
tions (the inescapable pre-order of facts), but rather the exegesis that man, “his-
torian-prophet” (Lotman 2009[1992]: 126), makes a posteriori, thereby building 
an interpretive category of history and a narrativization of memory ad hoc, a mo-
no-perspective. Culture, Lotman (2009[1992]: 126), writes, reconstructs its own 
past, transforms and corrects the memory and, with an eye in the past and the con-
sciousness in the present, interprets its own history as an “inevitable destination” 
(ibid.). 
If predictability is prepared and conducted by the chain of events, unpredict-
ability is their suspension: it is like a hole within the paradigm of possibilities 
(realized or latent), from which the unexpected spills out: the unexpected that 
can emerge both as an historical event – one only needs to think of the fall of the 
Roman Empire fall or the perestrojka – or, more generally, as an explosion of mean-
ing. Since in Culture and Explosion the dimension of time emerges significantly in 
its semiotized form, or history, particular attention is paid to explosion as an his-
torical turn – hence, the distinction between the binary structure and the ternary 
structure of explosion;27 however, it should not be forgotten that, both in this work 
and especially in the posthumous Unpredictable Mechanism of Culture, unpredict-
ability is an all-embracing concept: it is an opening of meaning in its more inter-
nal nature – polyglotism, namely the multiple and irreducible and (sometimes) 
inaccessible ways of the real saying itself; it is the multiplicity of the real itself – ex-
pressed and unexpressed, realized and in potential – which, just through the deep 
encounter of different languages and “many mutually dependent correlative “I”s” 
27  Lotman (2009[1992]: 167) explains the diff erence between ternary and binary structures 
in the following way: “[T]ernary structures retain certain values from the antecedent period 
and transport them from the periphery to the centre of the system. By contrast, the ideal binary 
system is represented by the complete destruction of all that already exists which is considered 
to be irremediably corrupt. Th e ternary system strives to adapt the ideal to reality, whereas 
the binary system seeks, in practice, to actualise an unrealizable ideal. In binary systems, the 
explosion penetrates life in its entirety. Th e ruthless nature of this experiment is not immediately 
apparent. First of all it att racts the most maximalist layers of society by virtue of its radicalism and 
a poetic subscription to the immediate construction of “a new earth and a new sky””. 
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(Lotman 2009[1992]: 24), shows itself in its own richness, diversity and untrans-
latability, unexpectedly demolishing the wall of the noumenal. 
In Lotman, the unpredictability and, therefore, the explosion of meaning crea-
te a possibility that man has to know the reality in a profound way, not stopping in 
front of a “reality” that seems to be (Kantianly) fatally unknowable, but crossing 
this boundary through multilingual dialogue.    
Because of the epiphany of heterogeneity, unpredictability is also the discovery 
of the different, of the utterly Other-than-self, that unhinges the mono-perspectivi-
ty imposing a multiple vision of the world. Misunderstanding, untranslatability, the 
(apparent) semiotic impermeabilities here become inexhaustible sources of new 
meaning, that is the real life of the semiosphere.  Acknowledging them helps the 
scholar of culture – and, more generally, the scientist – to resist the temptation to 
build a perfect system, a model unassailable because absolutely abstract, an ideal 
unity that does not have anything to do with reality. According to Lotman, in fact, 
science runs the risk to accommodate to the only abstraction, i.e., to a synthetic 
way of the mind proceeding, ideally unifying and systematizing; the reality, on the 
contrary, is essentially contradictory and to catch it means thinking in an antinomic 
way and espousing reason (dianoia) with intuition (nous) and experience (empei-
ria): this is what saves thought and being from an ideological and pragmatical turn-
ing, which always arises within a self-referential, polarized and unanchored vision 
of reality. In this sense, Lotman is very close to Florensky’s epistemology, founded 
just on the antinomy. This is deeply tied to the life, full of meanings and related 
opposites. People choose usually just one perspective since to keep one and its op-
posite is lacerating, but in this way they distort the integral experience of reality. 
It follows that what most people consider the truth is only one pole of the whole 
truth, drawing on this requires the courage to move from one’s own perspective to-
ward its opposite. Keeping alive one’s own truth and, encompassing its opposite at 
the same time, you enter antinomy.28 
We can definitely say that Lotman’s whole work and, in particular, his latest in-
tellectual production are pervaded with the pursuit of this tension between oppo-
sites and by the resolution in the maintaining of the alterity, the fount of the unpre-
dictable: the returning of the integral experience of reality is an inevitable conse-
quence of this. 
28  See Florensky 1997[1914].
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Эпистемология Лотмана: аналогия, культура, мир
По мнению Жанны Парэн-Виаль ( Jeanne Parain-Vial) людей – помимо потребности в логи-
ке и понятности – характеризует и потребность в аналогии, и эта потребность выражается 
в сфере науки в постоянном поиске моделей. Познаваемость вещей опирается на аналогию; 
таким образом, они описываются не одной моделью, а скорее посредством  многочислен-
ных и автономных форм понимания.
Как показали Юрий Лотман и Борис Успенский, возможность подобия между карди-
нально различными реалиями было постулировано в мифологическом мышлении, напри-
мер в космологической модели мира, в которой “вселенная, общество и чело веческое тело 
рассматривались как изоморфные миры”. Способность такого взгляда на мир сохранилось 
по их мнению и у людей постархаического периода и составляет основу когнитивной ак-
тивности и научного моделирования.
Статья рассматривает употребление аналогии в семиотической теории Юрия Лотмана 
с точки зрения ее эвристической и эпистемологической значимости.
Lotmani epistemoloogia: analoogia, kultuur, maailm
Jeanne Parain-Viali järgi iseloomustab inimesi lisaks vajadusele loogika ja mõistetavuse järele ka 
nende analoogiavajadus ning seda  vajadust väljendab teaduse vallas pidev mudelite otsimine, 
mis võivad heita valgust reaalsuse mõnedele omadustele, nimelt olla nendega analoogilised. Asja-
de teadmise võimalikkus tugineb analoogiale; seega ei ammenda neid üksainus teadmise mudel, 
vaid pigem mõistmise arvukad ja autonoomsed vormid.
Nagu on osutanud Juri Lotman ja Boriss Uspenski, postuleeriti väga erinevate reaalsuste 
vahelise sarnasussuhte kehtestamise võimalus kõigepealt müütilises mõtlemises, näiteks kos-
moloogilises maaimamudelis, milles “universumit, ühiskonda ja inimkeha peeti isomorfseteks 
maailmadeks”: võimalus, mis, nagu nad selgitavad, on säilinud ka postarhailistel inimestel, moo-
dustades kognitiivse aktiivsuse ja teadusliku modelleerimise ühe alustrajava koostisosa.
See artikkel on pühendatud analoogia kasutamisele Lotmani semiootilises teoorias ning selle 
heuristilisele ja epistemoloogilisele väärtusele.
